One of the greatest strengths of the law is that it applies equally to everyone. Whether the accused is an ordinary citizen or an influential personality, and whether the alleged offence is minor or extremely sensitive, it is the responsibility of the state and the courts to ensure that there is no discrimination in legal principles and established judicial procedures. Justice should not only be done; it must also be seen to be done.
Yet in Pakistan, the accused in the Hizb al-Shaitan cases appear to be receiving, for reasons unknown, a level of special concession and unusual treatment that is not even available to accused persons facing serious cases involving terrorism, drugs, human trafficking, and child trafficking.
The first question concerns the continued absence of government prosecutors. In these sensitive cases, the prosecutors appointed by the government have reportedly not been appearing before the courts for several months. Even in an ordinary criminal case, effective representation by the prosecution is considered essential. But in these highly sensitive cases, the absence of government counsel is astonishing.
The absence of prosecution representation is not a minor administrative lapse. It directly benefits the accused. When the government prosecutor is not present in court, the state’s position is not presented with full force, legal arguments raised by the accused do not receive an effective response, and the court is not properly assisted regarding the case record and evidence.
The question is: why has this situation continued for several months? Why are the relevant institutions not addressing this deficiency? If prosecution representation is considered necessary in an ordinary criminal case, why have these highly sensitive Hizb al-Shaitan cases been left without government prosecutors?
An Unusual Commission in the Islamabad High Court
The second example of special treatment is the commission established in the Islamabad High Court by Justice Sardar Ijaz Ishaq Khan.
The formation of this commission was described from the outset as exceeding constitutional and legal jurisdiction. Later, a division bench of the Islamabad High Court also suspended the proceedings. However, mere suspension does not eliminate the fundamental question that arose when the commission was established.
Thousands of cases involving terrorism, human trafficking, child trafficking, drugs, and other serious crimes are pending in Pakistani courts. Has a similar commission ever been established for the accused in those cases to intervene in an ongoing criminal proceeding in this manner?
If not, what was so special about the accused in the Hizb al-Shaitan cases that such an extraordinary route was adopted for them?
The procedure through which the commission was established also raises serious questions.
A fundamental principle of judicial justice is that all relevant parties to a case must be heard before a decision is made. Accepting the claims of one party as true while issuing a decision without hearing the other party is inconsistent with the principles of natural justice.
In this matter, surprisingly, the basic relief sought in the application itself was not prominently reflected in the decision. Yet, based on the unproven narratives of one party, a commission was established.
The other party was assured on multiple occasions that it would also be heard, but a decision was issued without providing it an effective opportunity of hearing.
This too appears to be a concession that is rarely seen in ordinary criminal cases. If an order of this nature is issued without hearing the state, the complainant, or another necessary party in a case, questions about the impartiality and transparency of the entire judicial process inevitably arise.
The Unusual Transfer of Bail Applications
The third—and perhaps most prominent—example of special treatment concerns the unusual transfer of bail applications.
According to Pakistan’s decades-long judicial tradition and established procedure, when a bail application of an accused person is heard and rejected by a judge, a subsequent bail application in the same case is generally placed before the same judge.
The purpose of this principle is to maintain judicial continuity and prevent the impression that a particular judge is being selected.
However, in the Hizb al-Shaitan cases, bail applications rejected by different judges of the Islamabad High Court were, upon being filed again, not placed before the respective judges. Instead, they were consolidated and placed before Justice Sardar Ijaz Ishaq Khan.
This was a departure from the usual procedure, and a clear and satisfactory explanation for it is necessary.
If a judge had already heard and rejected a bail application, why was a subsequent application not placed before the same judge?
Why were applications rejected by different courts brought together and transferred to one particular court?
Once again, the question is: do accused persons facing terrorism, drug offences, human trafficking, or child trafficking cases also receive the facility of having their rejected bail applications collected together and placed before a specific judge?
If this does not happen, then why was it necessary to depart from the established judicial practice in the Hizb al-Shaitan cases?
A Pattern That Requires Investigation
These incidents cannot simply be dismissed as separate administrative mistakes.
The absence of government prosecutors for several months, the establishment of an unusual commission without hearing all parties, and the consolidation of rejected bail applications from different courts before one particular judge together present a pattern that requires serious and impartial investigation.
The demand here is not to deprive any accused person of their legal rights.
Every accused person has the complete right to a fair trial, legal representation, defence, and to file a bail application according to law.
The real question is why the distinction between legal rights and special concessions is being blurred.
Accused persons must receive every right guaranteed to every citizen by the Constitution and the law. But why should they receive additional facilities that are not available to accused persons in other serious criminal cases?
The state institutions and judiciary must immediately address this perception.
Qualified and permanent government prosecutors should be ensured in these cases. Every necessary party should be given an effective opportunity of hearing throughout the judicial proceedings. And all applications, including bail applications, should be heard according to established judicial principles.
If the law truly applies equally to everyone, then the Hizb al-Shaitan cases should be conducted according to the same legal standards that apply to cases involving terrorism, human trafficking, child trafficking, drugs, and other serious offences.
And if different and unusual routes are repeatedly being adopted for the accused in these cases, then the Pakistani nation is justified in asking:
What exactly is so special about the accused in the Hizb al-Shaitan cases that they are being given facilities that are not even available to accused persons facing other serious crimes?
