Introduction
In the previous article, we introduced Hizb al-Shaytan and explained that it is not merely a collection of individuals posting blasphemous material on social media. Rather, it is an organised network that has developed its own religious identity, creed, book, internal concepts, and ideological framework.
The next question is even more important.
What does Hizb al-Shaytan actually want?
The answer is not based on an opponent’s interpretation of the group. It emerges from the writings and statements of Tayyab bin Arif, its founder and self-styled religious leader.
Tayyab bin Arif does not present himself merely as an administrator of an online group. He assigns himself a religious status and claims to receive messages or revelation from Satan. On that basis, he constructed a separate religious identity for his followers, introduced his own creed, and presented his writings in the form of religious instructions.
His book, Farman-e-Ajnabi, makes the underlying project increasingly clear from its opening sections. It replaces the worship of Allah with the worship of Satan and introduces a separate creed of its own. In other words, the objective is not limited to insulting Islam or its sacred personalities. It attempts to construct a satanic alternative religious system in opposition to Islam.
The second objective evident from Tayyab bin Arif’s writings and statements is the systematic destruction of reverence for Islamic sanctities. The Qur’an, the Prophet Muhammad ﷺ, the Ahl al-Bayt, the Mothers of the Believers, the Companions, and other Islamic sacred symbols are repeatedly targeted so that blasphemy ceases to remain an occasional act of provocation and instead becomes normalised within the group.
Apologies for the sensitivity of the subject: the language, imagery, and sexually explicit forms of blasphemy used for this purpose are too obscene to reproduce here. It is sufficient to state that pornography and religious desecration are deliberately combined in this material.
This is where pornographic blasphemy becomes one of the defining characteristics of the network.
Gradual Erosion of Religious Sensitivity
A third objective appears to be the gradual erosion of religious sensitivity among followers. Individuals are exposed to an environment in which ridicule of sacred beliefs is followed by increasingly severe forms of desecration, until participation itself becomes normalised.
In this way, a person who may initially experience shock or revulsion at such material can gradually be conditioned to tolerate it and, eventually, to participate in it.
A fourth objective is the creation of followers and operatives.
The project is not restricted to producing material. Such material has to be circulated, amplified, and reproduced. This requires people. The existence of groups, membership structures, communication networks, and assigned roles therefore becomes central to the expansion of the organisation.
The fifth, and perhaps most dangerous, objective is to move this ideology beyond small closed groups and spread it more widely through society.
If a handful of individuals privately held an offensive ideology, the danger would remain limited. But once that ideology has its own book, religious terminology, followers, online networks, and a deliberate effort to expand its reach, the matter moves beyond isolated individual misconduct.
It becomes an ideological and organisational project.
This is why Hizb al-Shaytan should not be understood merely as a group of young people posting offensive material online. Its own literature presents a much more serious picture: a self-created satanic religious system, systematic desecration of Islamic sanctities, the fusion of pornography with blasphemy, and an effort to bring more people into the same ideological structure.
So far, we have only examined what the group seeks to achieve.
Detailed video series discussion is also available here.
In the next part, we will examine a different and more practical question:
How does Hizb al-Shaytan operate?
That discussion will be based on the available statements, documentary evidence, and group material showing how individuals were brought into these networks, how they were assigned tasks, how membership was expanded, and how the organisation attempted to turn ordinary social media users into active participants.
